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LEGAL CULTURE 
 
 
Book Review - Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George 
(eds), Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution 
Making, Maintenance and Change.  
Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2001. 337 pages, softback, 
£15.95, ISBN 0-691-08869-1 
 
By Navraj Singh Ghaleigh* 
 
 
 
Under the leadership of Walter Murphy (McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, 
Emeritus), a distinctive approach to constitutional theory and politics has been 
taken at Princeton University for over two decades. In contrast to the vast swathe of 
scholarship in the field, the method of the ‘Princeton Group’ (the editors’ self-
appellation) is not the close textual analysis of doctrine or studies of judicial biog-
raphy. Rather, a broader, more contextually-sensitive set of questions is asked: 
what is the nature of constitutions, why should they be obeyed, and what are the 
variables of institutional design and the implications thereof? The answers to such 
questions cannot ignore what higher courts have said, but nor need they not look 
beyond them. Thus, the method of the group, and hence this volume, is informed 
by larger normative debates and empirical analysis, as well as constitutional case 
law. In common with much American scholarship, it has been undertaken by both 
academic lawyers and political scientists. Regarding subject matter, as the sub-title 
suggests, our attention is trained on the creation, maintenance and amendment of 
constitutions. 
 
According to the editors, the aspiration is to “cultivate the skills and the virtues of 
these categories of action as varieties of political competence.” (2 ) The basics of 
constitutional law as “varieties of political competence”? This is a straightforwardly 
provocative manifesto. Even if these “categories of action” take the discrete form of 
activity known as constitutional politics, it is likely to grate with those who insist 
on neat law/politics demarcations. Indeed, after reading its fourteen essays, read-
ers will be well disabused of the notion that constitutional adjudication is a discrete 
                                                 
*
  Lecturer in Public Law, School of Law, Edinburgh University – Editor (with Christian Jo-
erges), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism 
over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford: Hart, 2003). Thanks to Mario Mendez for 
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legal activity, if they ever held such an opinion. More importantly though, they will 
come away with the tools that allow them to establish a normatively defensible 
understanding of judicial and extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and a better 
sense of the place of constitutional courts in a democratic polity. For this reason 
alone, this book is warmly recommended. 
 
The comprehensive methodology of this project is nicely illustrated by the excellent 
essays by Stephen Macedo and Sanford Levinson. Both scholars examine the ques-
tion of normative diversity and the liberal constitution, focussing on the relation-
ship between religion and the state, but coming up with very different answers. 
Macedo (“Transformative constitutionalism and the case of religion: defending the 
moderate hegemony of liberalism”) essentially makes the case for marginalising 
illiberal religious practices on the back of an understanding of liberalism that goes 
beyond the standard rubric of mere ‘neutrality between differing conceptions of the 
good’. This classical definition, says Macedo,  
 
wholly misses the radically transformative dimension of liberal constitu-
tionalism, and is liable to obscure the extent to which a liberal constitu-
tional order is a pervasively educative order. (167 ).  
 
If we then accept that good, or “constitutional”, citizens are deliberately shaped by 
our (liberal) constitutional order, we will recognise that a common schooling sys-
tem has a pivotal role in this by taking on the civic task of reinforcing common be-
liefs and commitments so that they can be shared by all citizens. But should reli-
gious norms be amongst these common commitments? The answer given is No, on 
the basis that the diversity liberalism requires is that which supports, 
 
basic principles of justice and equal freedom for all [. They are]  predomi-
nantly civic forms of diversity…the political aim is to secure our civil inter-
ests, not to promote Protestantism over Catholicism (180 )….it is wrong to 
seek to coerce people on the grounds that they cannot share without con-
verting one’s faith (182 ). 
 
Does this lead to the exclusion of religious identities from the public sphere? To the 
extent that it does, Macedo argues that it is a price worth paying. Being “op-
pressed” into support for liberalism is “crucial political work”, indeed, it is “what 
transformative constitutionalism is all about.” Those that feel marginalized “have 
nothing but their own hypersensitivity to blame.” (182 ) 
 
Levinson’s parry (“Promoting diversity in the public schools”) commences with an 
account of his own background (Jewish) and early schooling in the American South 
and later at Duke  University where Methodism required morning prayers, Bible 
2003]                                                                                                                                     643 Book Review: Constitutional Politics
study classes and the singing of Carols. This of course predates the Supreme 
Court’s landmark ruling in Engel v. Vitale1 that found school prayers to be inconsis-
tent with the Establishment clause of the First Amendment. Nonetheless argues 
Levinson, these educative practices promote discussions between peoples of differ-
ing faiths (or none at all), such that they develop critical social and civic skills which 
are key to a multicultural society. The cost of excluding religion from public schools 
is to force out those with strong religious sensibilities, leading to a fragmented 
schooling system, with lessened inter-cultural exchange, shorn of its pluralist po-
tential.  
 
It is noteworthy that whilst Macedo’s argument is based almost entirely on refer-
ences to classic liberal political theory and its application to the instant problematic, 
Levinson proceeds with an issue-by-issue analysis of the Supreme Court’s case law 
(state aid, school prayers etc), intertwined with social theoretical contributions on 
multiculturalism. Thus, the reader is left with a comprehensive array of sources and 
tools from which to settle the debate (in her own mind). In this reviewer’s mind, 
Macedo errs in not accounting for the significant gains that pluralist religious de-
bate can add to civic culture and the very minor costs (if any at all) of such non-
secular input to the transformative capacities of his secular vision of liberalism. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the most commonly debated issue in this volume is that of consti-
tutional judicial review – the primary mechanism of constitutional maintenance 
(and change too, depending on how one classifies such things, i.e. are maintenance 
and change distinct processes or merely different points on a single spectrum?) – 
and judicial supremacy. The approaches taken vary. John Finn (“The Civic Consti-
tution: Some Preliminaries”) discerns two dimensions to the nature of constitutions 
– the civic (or political), and the juridic (or legal). Only by appreciating these as-
pects can the authority of a constitutional order be comprehensively accounted for 
– they are not alternatives but components of a larger whole. The question then 
arises as to what the mix should be between the two? Finn’s response is a rejection 
of both judicial and legislative supremacy, opting instead for departmentalism, 
according to which,  
 
each branch is entrusted with the power of interpreting the Constitu-
tion…[with the advantage that it would]  encourage judges and indeed 
other constitutional decision-makers to seek the strongest (and not merely 
the most convenient) arguments for their conclusions – arguments that 
could hope to persuade the widest possible audience. (59, 61) 
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Christopher Eisgruber (“Judicial Supremacy and Constitutional Distortion”) is 
similarly concerned by the dynamic relationship between what the constitution is 
and who should interpret it, although he adds the element of how it should be inter-
preted. His argument starts from the premise of judicial self-consciousness concern-
ing the democratic legitimacy of their function. Instead of directly addressing such 
worries, Eisgruber details how, in cases such as the infamous City of Boerne v. Flo-
res,2 the Court launches into highly legalistic or historical debates, ignoring the lar-
ger sweep of pivotal constitutional provisions, in this case, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In so doing, the Court is revealing its understanding of the Constitution to be 
a set of legal restraints in preference to it being an instrument facilitating self-
government. On this understanding, who then to interpret the Constitution but 
lawyers? – “a professional elite who may have no special insight into justice or poli-
tics but who are expert at the manipulation of fine-grained rules.” (71) 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, though, Eisgruber finds the solution to this lock-in to be 
in the Court’s own judgments, or at least the key to the solution. Recalling the plu-
rality decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,3 Eisgruber applauds the Court’s rejec-
tion of its own method in Roe v. Wade,4 a highly legalistic analysis which ignored 
(and in some instances diminished) important ethical issues such as the liberty in-
terests of the pregnant woman. In the latter opinion, the Court emphasised its goal 
to enable “the country…to see itself through its constitutional ideals”, describing 
the Constitution itself as “a covenant running from the first generation of Ameri-
cans to us and then to future generations [embodying]  ideas and aspirations that 
must survive more ages than one.”5 This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment then is clearly a guide to political ideals for non-lawyers and as such could be 
a “vehicle through which Americans can see what binds them together as a peo-
ple.” (84) That is all very well, but it is a key without a lock.6 Given the problem 
with which we started – that lawyers qua judges have manipulated interpretative 
hegemony of the Constitution for themselves – by what mechanism can this key 
have effect? Eisgruber implores Americans to “become self-conscience about the 
Constitution’s character…if [they]  are to be something more than the passive sub-
jects described in Casey, they must themselves become self-conscious about the 
                                                 
2
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3
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5
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6
  Further, Eisgruber rightly notes that the institutional theory of the case “champions the 
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Constitution’s character.” (85) But if interpretative hegemony rests with the judici-
ary, what incentives does the citizenry have to make that effort? And if they did, 
how would they wrestle hegemony away from the Courts? We are given few hints.7 
 
At this point, the essay by Whittington (“The political foundations of judicial re-
view”) makes itself most welcome. The basic thrust of the piece is an attack on the 
oft-unquestioned mantra that judicial supremacy is the essence of constitutionalism 
– see for a recent example, Jutta Limbach,8 but most famously propounded in 
Dworkin’s A Matter of Principle9 through his characterisation of courts as ‘forums of 
principle’. Previous critiques have claimed this to be a falsehood, that supreme 
courts are in fact ultimately controlled by the other branches,10 or in any event are 
the ‘least dangerous branch’.11 The tack taken here is different, in that judicial inde-
pendence is defended not only on a normative basis, but also as an empirical fact, 
albeit in specific settings. Thus, there are occasions when political considerations 
will mean that incentives exist for other constitutional actors – Whittington’s focus 
here is on the President – to “refrain from undermining judicial authority over con-
stitutional meaning.” (263) Such occasions may arise when the bounded rationality 
of the executive makes its well disposed to judicial leadership, or when that branch 
disposes of electorally tendentious issues. But of course, these are contingent, not 
necessary, settings. Carte blanche interpretative hegemony finds no foundation here, 
rather judicial supremacy is a function of cost/benefit analyses, or what Whitting-
ton calls, a “political logic”.(291) The novelty of this argument becomes clearer 
when we focus on the commonly advanced  bases for judicial independence – insti-
tutional isolation, fixed terms, or even the much maligned Herculean capacities to 
arrive at the ‘right answer’. The ‘departmentalism’ of Whittington however posits 
the judiciary as within a relatively ‘flat’ or egalitarian dialogical process in which 
political logic means that elected officials habitually have sound reasons to defer to 
judicial interpretations of the constitution. So long as that is the case, the judiciary 
will enjoy wide scope to interpret and enforce the constitution as they see fit. How-
ever, in so doing, they are bounded by a set of background ideological conditions 
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which has concrete manifestation in political attitudes. Should judicial decision-
making stray from these background conditions, the incentives for elected officials 
to raise challenges increases. What we then have is a theory of coordinate constitu-
tional interpretation. Although at certain times, certain branches will have the up-
per hand (and Whittington would presumably acknowledge that the judicial 
branch in America has been aided in that by the decline of political parties), the 
standard legal model of courts sitting atop the constitutional pyramid is no longer 
accurate, to the extent that it ever was. 
 
In summary, this is a collection of essays that substantially succeeds in its ambi-
tions. Powerful arguments are made as to the strongly political quality of constitu-
tional affairs, the best means by which they may be advanced and their normative 
underpinnings. It cannot be said that all the authors make equal contributions – 
there are a minority of somewhat weak pieces. But the sum is a collection that will 
give both a general roadmap to those that require one, and food for thought for 
more advanced readers. In terms of substantive law, most of the examples are 
drawn from American constitutional law, although there is a good contribution by 
James Fleming which takes Ackerman’s critique of American exceptionalism in 
rights protection to task, by comparison with Germany. That said, readers would be 
mistaken to question the applicability of the lessons of this book on the basis of that 
limited scope. Substantially similar concerns occupy constitutional debates across 
advanced democracies. The doctrinal tools used to resolve them differ, but the es-
sential questions are common and the level of reasoning adopted in most of the 
discussions herein is sufficiently high to vault the low hurdles of parochial legal 
technique. Constitutional democracy is not quite the simple, static, structure it is 
conventionally imagined to be. As Walter Murphy notes in his delicious opening 
chapter, it is certainly true that judicial review “allows losers in the political process 
to appeal to judges rather than to heaven.” (15) But from this it does not follow that 
by providing a God-like proxy on earth, the Courts have assumed His status. 
